The Cairo Criminal Court has referred Mohammad Morsi the death sentence for his alleged role in orchestrating the escape of thousands of prisoners in 2011, to the Grand Mufti. His advice carries moral weight. The important final verdict is expected to be announced on June 2.

 

The verdict not only concerns Mohammed Morsi but also other leading Muslim Brotherhood members. Appeal is possible.

 

Morsi’s lawyer stated that Morsi will not appeal the decision because he does not recognize the legitimacy of the trial. He still insists that he is Egypt’s legitimate president. Morsi is supported by the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy (NASL), a pro-Morsi group set up after his deposal in 2013. The NASL argues this trial is illegitimate because he remains Egypt’s elected president. The group calls on Egyptians “to sustain and escalate the struggle,” and “participate in the extended revolutionary wave beneath the banner “Victory and Retribution.”

 

Muslim Brothers in Europe and the US are largely supportive of this stance. Party member Amr Darrag described the verdict as “a political verdict against which the international community needs to protest.”

 

This is reflecting of the refusal by the Muslim Brotherhood to acknowledge that they have alienated large sectors of the Egyptian population in the period Morsi was in power. It is also reflecting the refusal to recognize the large popularity of al-Sisi that brought him a resounding election victory one year ago. This was a 96.91% majority, which generally is not believed to be possible. But this was primarily due to the Muslim Brotherhood boycotting the elections and Egyptians were yearning, after three years of instability, for a strong president since it was widely believed that only a strong man representing a strong institution (the army) could bring stability.

 

In interviews I have conducted with Muslim Brotherhood leaders in 2013and in March and August 2014, they refuse to recognize these facts. They continued to insist that former president Morsi had to return to the presidency. Some accept this to be accompanied by elections. But then why did Morsi not accept presidential elections in the first days of July 2013 when this was still possible?

 

I am fully in favor of political compromises and ending escalatory politics. The statements of Morsi and the NASL sound principled and heroic but they are nothing but evidence of a general lack of willingness to seek political compromises.

 

Since president Morsi was removed Egypt has seen a lot of political violence, especially in the targeted killings of army and police personnel. After the death sentences three prosecutors were ambushed in Sinai and killed. In Minufiya the office of the prosecutor was attacked and parts of the building were set in fire. Elsewhere electricity pylons were bombed causing power cuts in several towns and villages.

 

Muslim Brothers frequently argue that they are not responsible for targeted killings. Some claim that these killings are the result of general dissatisfaction with the Egyptian regime, but then why are in particular the strongest opponents to the Muslim Brotherhood targeted? Some Brotherhood supporters claimed that Egypt’s security is responsible for these killings so that they obtain the argument to lash out even harder to the Muslim Brotherhood. But if this were to be true, would this not surely result in resistance within the security and army? Why, an Ambassador asked, if the Brothers are not responsible for the killings, do they not explicitly denounce this?

 

Prior to the Economic Conference in Sharm el-Sheikh in March of this year a Muslim Brotherhood channel based in Turkey threatened to kill president al-Sisi and his family. Participants to the conference were threatened as well. Why did the Brotherhood leadership allow this to happen?

 

Political violence and threats have resulted in a widespread rejection in Egypt of any compromise with the Muslim Brotherhood. In towns and villages one sees the images of slain security and army personnel on the houses of their families. Security officers refuse to talk about compromises. That would be too hard to swallow after the targeted killings of so many of their colleagues. There is a very deep anger that is hardly seen in the Western media.

 

Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, founder of the Ibn Khaldoun Center, told me that lower judges are often to be ‘more royal then the king,’ more pro-Sisi and more nationalistic than the president himself is. Draconian verdicts are seen as a sign of patriotism, truly defending the nation against what they believe to be the evil of the Muslim Brotherhood. Appeals are possible and in appeal many sentences in lower courts have been softened. The draconian sentences in lower courts have been used by Muslim Brothers to advocate their cause, to present themselves as martyrs. Publicity wise these sentences are a disaster. One can understand the anger against political violence but first pronouncing a death sentence and later softening this gives opponents of the regime a chance to exploit this for publicity.

 

Mustafa al-Badri, a leading member of the Salafist Front, sees the rulings as an effort to pressure the opponents of the regime, possibly using this as bargaining chips in any future negotiations. Al-Badri calls for “a strong and effective campaign against the regime.”

 

Nader Bakar, spokes person of the Nour Party, tweeted “We had hoped things would never reach this state.” “We have warned of the danger of such escalatory tactics. We fear negative consequences for the nation, social division and damage to Egypt’s international reputation.” 

 

Former Sudanese president Swar al-Dahab stated that the verdicts “will not help restore stability in Egypt. Verdicts such as these, which convince neither local not international public opinion, only court more chaos.”

 

Amnesty International denounced the court’s ruling as a “charade based on null and void procedures.” Amnesty International is widely respected in the West and many Western media outlets have taken over their arguments without doing their own independent research which is sad.

 

I have been in meetings with Amnesty International and other human rights activists. Where they see their role as reporting violations of international human rights standards, we are trying to present a larger overall picture that does justice to the many different social factors one needs to take into consideration to understand what is happening in Egypt. Human rights reporting is important but if the focus is only on human rights reporting one tends to overlook the other factors at work.

 

The context that we needed to describe is that there is a war going on between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime. Every method seems to be allowed; killings, threats and disinformation on the side of the Brotherhood and/or their sympathizers; draconic verdicts on the side of the judiciary, restricting freedoms to stop Brotherhood and other rhetoric as well as other methods.

 

Both parties, not just one, have been digging themselves in. The death penalty of Morsi is a step in further escalating tensions between the Brotherhood and the regime. What will happen if Morsi indeed refuses to appeal since this would, in his view, mean acknowledging the validity of this trial? This verdict thus puts Egypt in a very difficult situation.

 

Political analyst Osama Al-Ghazali Harb speaks of a stand-of between two parties in which “victory for one party means total loss for the other.” He believes that before the verdict there was still talk about a possible reconciliation with the Muslim Brotherhood which now seems less likely than ever.

 

Al-Ahram analyst Amr El-Shobaky, however, believes “political Islam, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, can still be integrated in Egypt’s political process.” He argues “there is still a moderate camp within the Muslim Brotherhood that believes in liberal democracy and civil government. It could become part of the mainstream opposition. It is radically different to the conspiratorial clique led by Morsi and his fellow fanatics.”

 

Both analysts present the wider context in which the verdict needs to be placed. Many Western media, including 

 

Tthe Dutch daily Trouw in its editorial comment of May 20, are reporting what Amnesty International and other human rights activists write about Egypt, without being sufficiently aware that this is a war between the Muslim Brotherhood and the government of al-Sisi.

 

President al-Sisi, they simply conclude, is busy to turn Egypt rapidly in a dictatorship with disrespect for personal freedoms. Following Amnesty International reporting they have no confidence in Egyptian court procedures and thus neither that Morsi cooperated with Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. 

 

Per definition dismissing Egyptian court verdicts is unfair and each verdict should be carefully scrutinized. There are certainly circumstances that point into Morsi cooperating with Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. 

 

I remember well that sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawy returned from Qatar to Egypt to preach at Tahrir square on February 18, 2011, to hundreds of thousands of Islamists, one week after Mubarak resigned, that the revolution was unfinished. After Mubarak’s resignation other heads of Mubarak’s party, the National Democratic Party, had to disappear.

 

Egyptians did not miss to see the resemblance with the return of Ayatollah Khomeiny to Iran in 1979. Liberal youth told me stories how they were pushed out and were prevented from making their own political statements. I have repeatedly heard stories from people in demonstrations in 2011 that Hamas fighters were around. In 2011 I have met with a wounded Hamas fighter in a Cairo café following clashes between security and demonstrations in the Mohammed Mahmoud street. There is no doubt that during this period of utter chaos there were foreign influences, including Dutch government support for April 6 movement activists. It is also known that the Brotherhood and Morsi sought support of radical Islamists. Morsi, early during his reign visited Iran, opening Egypt for Iranian influences.

 

Mohammed Mabrouk, the state security officer charged with recording Morsi’s foreign contacts in January 2011, which later played a role in the jailbreak court case, was assassinated in November 2013, during the period of violence and curfew after Morsi’s removal from office. The jailbreak case was first heard in the Ismailia Court in 2012 and 2013 when Morsi was still in office. It shows that documents have been presented to court. These are all clear indications of a war between Islamists led by the Muslim Brotherhood and non-Islamists. Trouw does not mention this.

 

The Trouw commentary continues: Even if Morsi was a danger for democracy the way the regime of al-Sisi lashes back is causing deep concern because of the large numbers of imprisonments and death sentences; 105 in the same verdict against Morsi and in 2014 there were another 1200 death sentences. Each form of critique, according to Trouw, is dangerous to the extent that Henk Glimmerveen, friend of AWR, cautiously inquired if it would be safe to receive such an article by email. Yes, this is safe and critique is possible but siding publicly with the Muslim Brotherhood is indeed dangerous since being in favor of one party in the war automatically is seen as being the enemy of the other.. 

 

Trouw reports that at least 230 secular dissidents have obtained life sentences. Others escaped and 40,000 people – according to Trouw, are waiting for their sentences. I am not so certain these numbers are correct since numbers are so often provided by sources with a political stake who do not mind some inflation. Trouw is lamenting that protests from Western governments are very muted. 

 

Much of Trouw’s comment is related to the lack of Egyptians explaining what is taking place in Egypt. The consequence is that the words of political activists, including those of the Muslim Brotherhood, are heard in the West while the complex processes taking place in Egypt are hardly recognized. Another problem is that in a polemic atmosphere Egyptians tend to see nothing good in the arguments of their opponents while one would have to admit that on both sides there are valid arguments that should be considered. 

 

It is my wish that both government and Muslim Brotherhood make efforts to get out of this spiral of ongoing escalations and that Amnesty International and Western media would be less judgmental and recognize the difficulty of getting out of this vicious process of escalations.

 

 

 

For this commentary I made use of:

Gamal Essam El-Din, Beyond the Judgement, Al-Ahram Weekly, May 21-May 27, 2015

Amany Maged, A Game of Wait and See, Al-Ahram Weekly, May 21-May 27, 2015

For an Egyptian critique on al-Sisi and the government’s policies read:

Dina Ezzat, Diminishing Returns, Al-Ahram Weekly, May 21-May 27, 2015